A medication error is an adverse event or even a miss in the treatment process that may harm a patient. As a consequence of this, patients' diseases may recrudesce and the mortality rate could rise. Therefore, medication errors have consequences in human terms and result in higher medical costs. Advanced inpatient medication safety systems can help reduce such errors in hospitals. Radio-frequency identification (RFID)-based systems are a promising solution for such applications. In this context, RFID grouping-proofs have been proposed to generate evidence that a collection of tags were read at the same time. These proofs are useful for automating the five rights method (right patient, right drug, right dose, right route, and right time). Wu et al. recently proposed an RFID grouping-proof. Unfortunately, the security level offered by this protocol is too low, as demonstrated here. This study shows how a passive attacker can conduct a full-disclosure attack. The cost of the proposed attack is only 32 O(2 ) , which is inappropriate for medical applications, and thus the attack requires only a few minutes on a personal computer. In addition, a de-synchronization attack can be conducted with only two runs of the protocol. Finally, as the idea of using grouping-proofs seems useful to enhance patient safety, a protocol called EKATE is proposed and a security analysis is performed.
Introduction
The use of radio-frequency identification (RFID) was increased due to its advantages over other identification systems. Some hospitals and medical institutes have started to establish RFID testing projects for applications such as drug administration, access to medical records, equipment/patient identification, and patient/staff tracking to improve patient safety, reduce medical errors, and optimize business processes [1] . The increasing number of academic articles related to RFID applications and issues in eHealth clearly shows the high applicability and wide interest in using this technology in the healthcare sector [2, 3] .
The typical RFID infrastructure that hospitals may hold [4] is shown in Fig. 1 . RFID systems consist of tags, readers, and a back-end database which is often integrated with the hospital information system (HIS) [5] . RFID tages can be applied to staff members, patients, medical equipment, and drug packages. Staff members are equipped with hand-held readers (e.g., Mobile Clinical Assistant Reader (MCAR)) that allow access to the hospital applications through the wireless network. Moreover, fixed readers are deployed to cover the infrastructure of the hospital, including gates, rooms, operating theatres, corridors, and medical equipment. Figure 2 shows the patient life cycle. After arrival (admission), a patient is labeled with an RFID wristband that contains an identification number (ID) and some extra information. Next, the patient is examined (examination phase) and some actions are taken to treat her illness. During this phase, actors (i.e., patients, nurses, and doctors) are identified and their actions are registered in the electronic medical record (EMR) of the patient. During the patient care the staff identification and the log of their actions are similarly performed. The vital signs (e.g., blood pressure and temperature) of the patient are added to the EMR and her medicines and specimen collections are identified. The assets (e.g., beds, serum holders) can be identified and health workers can easily access the history. During the recovery phase, RFID technology provides a positioning system for tracking patients, which is essential for Alzheimer and psychiatric patients. Finally, when the doctor discharges the patient, the cleaning staff receives a message. An intelligent process is triggered and information about the room items (e.g., last cleaning of the mattress) can be read through the tags. Moreover, automatic and accurately inventory of the room can be performed, with the information sent to the stock management system. The patient can benefit from the use of RFID technology at home if her home network is connected to the HIS. If so, nurses, doctors, and home caregivers can be identified at the patient's house. Moreover, drugs can be identified and an alarm can be raised in case of error (e.g., incorrect drug, dose, route, or time).
Medication errors and patient safety
Patient safety is a crucial issue in all hospitals. As reported in [6] , the rate of potentially life-threatening medication errors ranges from 3% to 21% while that of clinically significant errors ranges from 3.3% to 31%. The problem is that hospitals cannot quickly and precisely identify actors (staff and patients) and check the proper administration of medicines [7] . Medication errors can be produced during different phases: prescription, manufacturing, or dispensing of the formulation, administering the treatment, and monitoring therapy. Information technology (IT) could help prevent medication errors. For example, the use of IT tools can easily prevent the misinterpretation of a hand-written prescription. Drug and patient identification systems can automate certain processes to guarantee that the appropriate prescription is given to each patient.
International studies have shown that medications errors occur predominately with medication orders (prescription and dispensing) or the administration of medication [8, 9] . Table 1 summarizes the kinds of error and their ratios (average values obtained from [23] [24] [25] 27] and [27] respectively). Medication errors can be reduced using the five rights method: right patient, right drug, right dose, right route, and right time [10] . The five rights should be accepted by nurses as the goal of the medication process. Nevertheless, nurses work under a lot of pressure and the use of intelligent systems could reduce their workload and decrease their slips and lapses [11, 3] . Hospitals have started to use various solutions to guard medication activities [12] . Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) prevents hand-writing errors and can be combined with clinical decision support tools to avoid prescription errors (e.g., drug-and-drug iteration). An automatic dispensing system (EDS) efficiently manages, stores, and dispenses medications. Barcode systems improve the identification processes of drugs and biological products. Finally, RFID-based solutions empower the aforementioned identification and traceability processes due to its advantages over barcode solutions. For instance, RFID tags do not need line of sight to be read and can be read from a distance of several meters at a rate of hundreds of reads per second.
Research problem
In the healthcare sector, grouping-proof protocols can be used for patient, staff, drug, or asset management [2] . Several RFID grouping-proof protocols have been recently proposed in the eHealth context [13, 14, 15] . Nevertheless, later analysis has shown that these solutions do not provide the claimed security level and the schemes have serious security faults [16, 17, 18] . Wu et al. [19] proposed a lightweight grouping-proof protocol that overcomes the security weaknesses of its predecessors. The present study verifies the security and efficiency of this protocol. The following research questions are addressed: 
Our contribution
This article scrutinizes the security level guaranteed by a proposal for medication systems based on RFID technology proposed by Wu et al. [19] and shows how this protocol offers low security. More precisely, the security level of this scheme is upper bounded by
value), where L is the length of the secret parameter. The authors suggest fix L to 64, which provides inadequate security protection for medical environments. That is, from the point of view of an adversary, the attack has a complexity of about 2 32 invocations of pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) functions that can be executed on a PC in a fraction of a minute. Furthermore an adversary can make the tag and the sever reach different internal states (i.e., the entities will not share a key). This will make the tag and server unsynchronized, making the protocol useless. The efficiency of the protocol was not examined in depth. It is shown that the scheme can be slightly changed to increase efficiency by up to 25% while retaining the security level. However, neither the original protocol nor the modified version is recommended for critical applications due to their low security. Finally, a protocol called EKATE that offers an appropriate security level is proposed for preventing medical errors.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and describes Wu et al.'s grouping-proof protocol. A security analysis and performance evaluation are presented in Section 3. Section 4 introduces an enhanced and generalized grouping-proof protocol, called EKATE, and presents its security and performance analyses. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 5.
Literature review
RFID was originally designed for identifying labeled items. Researchers have focused on designing secure authentication protocols [20] . Recently, RFID technology with grouping-proof has been proposed to improve patient safety. RFID-based solutions are baked up by the wide usage of RFID technology and its recommendation by regulation authorities (e.g., in the USA, pharmaceutical manufactures should attach RFID tags to products as recommended by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)).
The concept of grouping-proof (also known as yokingproof, existence-proof, clumping-proof, binding-proof, and coexistence-proof) for an RFID system was first introduced by Juels [21] . Grouping-proof schemes allow multiple RFID tags to be scanned at once such that their co-existence is guaranteed. In RFID authentication protocols, the reader is permanently connected to the verifier (back-end database), which can be on-line (similar to authentication protocols) or off-line. Readers interested in the design and analysis of grouping-proofs can refer to [16] .
In the healthcare sector, grouping-proof protocols can be used for patient, staff, drug, or asset management [2] . For instance, in a typical application of a grouping-proof protocol, the reader (e.g., MCAR held by a nurse) scans the identification of the nurse, the wristband of a patient, and the unit dose of drugs needed for her treatment (see Fig. 3 ). Therefore, the patient is identified and her medication is automatically checked. Several RFID grouping-proof protocols have been proposed in the eHealth context. In [14] , Huang and Ku proposed a grouping-proof protocol for medication safety of inpatients. The authors distinguish the pallet tag from other tags (items). In the medical sector, the pallet corresponds with the patient's bracelet and the tagged items refer to the other labels that interact with the patient (e.g., drugs, medical equipment, etc.). This protocol uses a PRNG function to encrypt messages exchanged between the entities, i.e., pallet, items, and readers. Unfortunately, later analyses demonstrated important security pitfalls: possible denial of service attacks [13] , traceability and impersonation attacks [17] , and forgery attacks [16] .
To overcome the above weaknesses, Chien et al. [13] proposed on-line and off-line protocols. However, their protocols suffer from traceability, impersonation, forgery, and replay attacks [17, 3] . In [3] , Peris-Lopez et al. proposed an interesting solution to enhance inpatient medication safety, called the Inpatient Safety RFID System (IS -RFID). Nevertheless, Yen et al. [18] showed that IS-RFID does not detect denial of proof attacks and that the generated medication evidence cannot defend against counterfeit evidence generated from the hospital. Finally, they designed two lightweight RFID-based solutions for secure inpatient medication administration, one with an on-line verifier and the other with an off-line verifier. RFID tags are very constrained devices with severe computational and storage limitations. To optimize the footprint supported on-board of RFID tags, Yu et al. [15] proposed a lightweight grouping-proof protocol, which is exclusively based on bitwise operations (e.g., XOR and AND).
Although the protocol seems quite attractive, the scheme is vulnerable against impersonation attacks, as showed in [19] .
In [19] , Wu et al. proposed a lightweight grouping-proof protocol to overcome the security weaknesses of another protocol [15] . Table 2 summarizes the notation and Fig. 4 shows the protocol. The protocol uses a 16-bit PRNG function and bitwise exclusive OR operations (i.e., XOR), which are supported on-chip in electronic product code (EPC) Class-1 Genetation-2 tags [22] . Since the channel between the reader and the back-end database is secure, the two entities can be condensed into one and the two names can be used indistinctly. The core function of Wu et al.'s protocol is a permutation function, denoted by F, which is a random permutation function mapping within the range L [1, 2 ] , where L is the security parameter. The implementation of the F function is shown in  proposed in [18] .
The messages exchanged between the reader ( R ) and the two tags (T a and T b ) involved in the proof are described below:
1. R broadcasts "Hello" with timestamp t to the tags in its working range. 2. Once T a and T b receive this message, they reply with a a a a a {IDS , r ,
, respectively. 3. The reader forwards them along with timestamp t to the server. 4. The server verifies that the received t is under a reasonable threshold. If the verification succeeds, it:
If either of the two authentication tokens is incorrect, the server will inform the reader that the protocol has failed. Otherwise it proceeds as follows: 
Inversion of F function
To determine the complexity of computing 
Wu et al. used the F function instead of a simple PRNG function to increase the security level of their protocol compared to that of EPC-friendly proposals. Then, the security level of the F function was determined. Given the output of the F function, i.e. C F(M)  , we present an approach to find its input, i.e., M . Our proposal to disclose the M value is also useful for determining the security level of F. The procedure is described below: 
4. Given the above equations, perform a meet-in-the-middle attack to retrieve executions of the PRNG function). This attack ruins all the security properties offered by the protocol. In fact, once the secret parameters of the tag are known, it is straightforward for an adversary to run many other 100% successful attacks: 1) traceability attacks; 2) tag impersonation attacks; 3) reader impersonation attacks; 4) de-synchronization attacks.
Full disclosure attack
Remark 1 It should be noted that an adversary can disclose the secret parameters of the other participant in the proof (tag  are also eavesdropped.
Although the proposed attack is a passive attack, an active adversary could send a random timestamp t and "Hello" messages to the target tags, store their replies, and then jump to phase 2 of the given attack. In this case, the adversary does not need to wait for a session initiated by a legitimate reader.
De-synchronization attack
Although the above attack ruins all the security properties of Wu et al.'s [19] protocol, there are other weak points in the protocol's design. This section presents an efficient and practical de-synchronization attack. In this attack, the adversary misleads the tag and the server to update their common secret values to different values. As consequence of this in the healthcare environment is that the patient tag will not be authenticated by the server in future transactions and the patient will not receive the expected treatment.
Remark 2 It should be noted that a naive approach to desynchronize tag i T and the server is to block i  message that is sent from the reader to the tag. At this stage, the server will update the tag records but no update will be performed on the tag side. To fix this problem, the server has to keep the old and new secret values. In the rest of this section, the most advanced scenario, in which the server keeps two records (old and new) for each tag, is assumed. The proposed attack is based on the observation that the random number generated by the tag i T , i.e., i r , is directly XORed with F(t) . Therefore, given t , the adversary can calculate F(t) and determine i r such that i F(t) r  meets a desired condition. The proposed attack has two phases. In phase 1, the adversary eavesdrops one session of the protocol through the insecure wireless channel between the reader and the patient tag. In phase 2, the adversary uses the information captured in phase 1 to impersonate the tag and forces the server to update its secret parameters such that in future sessions it will not recognize the tag with a high probability. More precisely, in phase 1, the adversary A eavesdrops one run of the protocol between the reader i R and tag i T and stores the exchanged values. The values captured are as follows:
At the end of this phase, both the server and the tag update , respectively. The old values are not updated due to the fact that an old IDS ( IDS' IDS  ) was used. That is, the server was deceived by the attacker into thinking that the previous session failed.
Therefore, given that t t '
 , at the end of the attack the server keeps two records (old and new values) for the tag, where neither of them match the stored values in the tag (see Table 3 for details). The complexity of the proposed attack is the execution of two protocol sessions. The adversary success probability is , where k is the bit-length of the random numbers used in the protocol. Remark 3 It should be noted that a tag backscatters indiscriminately its IDS when it is queried by a reader. The IDS does not change if the tag has not taken part in a successful run of the protocol. Therefore, once the tag is in a de-synchronized state, it will never update its IDS. An adversary could exploit this property to track the tag holder.
Performance of wu et al.'s protocol
The security level of Wu et al.'s scheme is conditioned by the design of the random permutation function ( F ). As shown previously, the security of F is upper bounded by L 2 O (2 ) , where L is the security parameter. An interesting observation regarding the attack presented in Section 3.1 is that the last layer of the F function (i.e., the last invocation of the PRNG function in the computation of All the calculations in Wu et al.'s scheme are calls to the F function or XOR computations. Therefore, any optimization in the F function decreases the protocol complexity roughly at the same rate. Since the security level of imp F is equivalent to that offered by the F function, while the latter has more invocations of the PRNG, the usage of imp F seems more appropriate. Nevertheless, neither of these functions is recommended in critical applications such as medication administration due to the low security level provided.
EKATE-improved grouping-proof
To fix the weaknesses of Wu et al.'s protocol and generalize it to any number of tags, an encryption function is used instead of the random permutation F. This encryption function can be any secure lightweight block cipher such as PRESENT-128 [23] for which the block length is 64 bits and the key length is 128 bits. The design guidelines presented in [16] are followed and the classical assumption that the channel between the reader and the back-end database is secure is made. Nevertheless, considering the possible existence of dishonest readers, the server also contributes to the protocol randomness by generating a random number s r , which is stored in the reader memory for the next session. In addition, to support the cases where several readers are interacting with the server, an identity is assigned to each reader, denoted by r ID . The improved grouping-proof, called EKATE and depicted in Fig. 7 
If either of the above conditions is not satisfied, the server will inform the reader that the run has failed. Otherwise, it does as follows:
 computes a key for each tag j T , In the EKATE proof, similar to Wu et al. in [19] , the server has to perform O(i.N) computations to verify 1,...,i P , where N is the total number of tags covered by the current reader and i is the number of tags involved in the proof.
Security of EKATE protocol
In the improved protocol, any exchanged messages are, explicitly or implicitly, randomized either by t', which is contributed by the reader and the server, or r , which is contributed by the tag. Therefore, the adversary cannot use messages previously eavesdropped in a later session. More precisely, the improved protocol can resist certain possible attacks as follows:
Replay Attack: In the proposed protocol, after each authentication, the server updates the nonce r r . Hence, it is not possible to use the previous eavesdropped message at a later time. The only exception is the case where the reader stores a message at time t 1 , based on the random number r r , and tries to use it at time t 2 . Nevertheless, the server updates the nonce and 2 1 r r t t r r '    should be satisfied, where r r' is the new record of the random number generated by the server. That is, a dishonest reader has no control over the time in order to successfully perform the above attack.
Impersonation Attack: It is not viable to impersonate the reader to tag T j (reader impersonation) because an adversary, who is not connected to the server, cannot calculate a valid K j and therefore a valid j  . Similarly an adversary cannot impersonate T j to the reader (tag impersonation) because she has no knowledge of Y j and ID j to generate K j , which is randomized by t', contributed by the reader. Therefore, the protocol resists reader and tag impersonation attacks.
ID-theft Attack by a Dishonest Reader: The tag ID is always transmitted encrypted with a key that is only shared between the tag and the server, and the dishonest reader cannot decrypt it. Hence, any dishonest reader which is involved in a proof cannot disclose any extra information related to the tag.
De-synchronization Attack: The server updates the tag secret values after its successful authentication. If the protocol continues such that the tag also authenticates the server, then they share the same secret values and are in a synchronized state. However, if the protocol is aborted before the tag updates its secrets values, then the tag can be identified by means of the old values kept in the server. It should be noted when the server authenticates the tag, any eavesdropped information up to this point would be useless (with a high probability) because the server refreshes the reader random number. Hence, it is infeasible to deceive the server to use eavesdropped information linked to old sessions while the tag has updated its records (i.e., the attack presented in Section 3.2 does not work against the proposed protocol).
Creating Wrong Proof: To create a wrong proof, the reader/adversary should impersonate the tags, which is not viable. In addition, any proof generated at time t cannot be used for time t '' t  because t is part of the encryption key for generating m j . Table 4 shows a performance comparison between Wu et al.'s protocol and the EKATE scheme. The table shows that the proposed grouping-proof does not significantly increase the computational cost while offering a higher security level. In this table, l denotes the bit-length of parameters, with a value of 64 suggested in the original protocol [19] . The first three columns evaluate the number of calls to the cryptographic primitives (PRNG or encryption functions) and the usage of XOR operations. The computations needed for the updating of the internal values are included in these calculations. In addition, for the reader and the server, the average cost per tag is computed. The last two columns evaluate the memory requirements (stored bits (SB)) and the usage of the channel (number of transferred bits (TB)). Wu et al. ' s proof makes extensive use of the PRNG whereas EKATE makes few calls to the encryption function. The memory requirements and the number of messages exchanged are similar. 2 , which is far from the optimum security margin of 2 L claimed by Wu et al., where L the bit-length of the security parameter. Regarding performance, the F function was not carefully designed. A slight change in its design leads to a 25% improvement in performance. The grouping-proof EKATE, which offers an appropriate security level and performance, was proposed. The proposed proof is a feasible tool for preventing medical errors.
Performance analysis of EKATE protocol

